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Summary findings
Using  a political  economy  approach,  Grether,  de  Melo,  reflects  political  support,  and  in which  the presence  of
and  Olarreaga  analyze  the  pattern  of protection  in  foreign  direct  investment  in the  sector  strongly  affects
Mexico's  manufacturing  sector  during  the period  of  the pattern  of  tariff protection  before  and  after  reform.
trade  policy  reforms  (1985-89),  when  Mexico  In Mexican  manufacturing,  especially,  sector,; with
experienced  significant  trade  liberalization  and  an  heavy  foreign  direct  investment  received  greater
important  inflow  of foreign  direct  investment.  protection  in import-competing  sectors,  althou-h  the
They  take  into  account  the  potential  effect  of foreign  move  toward  greater  openness  was associated  v,,ith a
direct  investment  on endogenous  tariff  formation.  reduction  in the  influence  of industrial  and  foreign-
It turns  out  that  the  data  support  this  analytic  investor  lobbying.
approach,  in which  the formulation  of trade  policy
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The political  economy literature  is increasingly called upon  to help gain a better
understanding  of the  pattern  of protection.  To explain  different  protection  levels in
different industries,  it is necessary to  focus on the role played by  different domestic
pressure  groups in the  determination  of protection.  With  Foreign Direct  Investment
(FDI)  increasing  at  an  average of 27 percent  per  year during  the  period  1985-1995,
pressures  arising  from  the  participation  of foreign groups  in  lobbying is  becoming
a significant  determinant  of the  structure  of protection.  Arguably,  such  pressures
are  likely to  be  particularly  important  in  the  manufacturing  sectors  of developing
countries  where FDI  is sizeable.
The  theoretical  literature  has  identified several mechanisms  through  which  FDI
may affect  levels of protection.  Quid pro quo FDI,  which takes  place in  anticipation
of  tariff  increases  in  the  host  country,  may  help  to  defuse  protectionist  pressures
through  several channels,  as suggested  by Bhagwati,  Dinopoulos  and  Wong (1992).
It  can for example  buy  goodwill from the  host  country  government  or co-opt labor
unions and weaken their  incentives to lobby for protection  'to save jobs'.  Hillman and
Ursprung  (1993) also suggested that  increasing FDI  inflows may lead to lower levels of
protection.  This is because, when FDI  rises, import  competition  is reduced, as foreign
firms now sell from the host  country  (FDI).
While the theoretical  literature  has generally identified mechanisms through  which
FDI  reduces protection  levels, one may think of at least two mechanisms through  which
FDI  may  lead to  higher  tariffs in  the  host  country.  Indeed,  this  will occur if either
FDI  has a better  lobbying technology due to a larger experience in lobbying or if host
governments  are more sensitive to FDI  interests  due for example to a higher credibility
of foreign firms in the lobbying game.  There is some anecdotal  evidence that  this has
been the  case recently when several Eastern  European  countries  negotiated  bilateral
trade  agreements  with  the  European  Union  or in  the  case of Mercosur,  where  the
automobile  sector is excepted from internal  free-trade and has an important  presence
iof foreign firms.
The  aim of this  paper  is to try  to identify  the role played  by FDI in the  determi-
nation  of Mexican trade  policy.  A Mexican case study  is relevant for  at  least  four
reasons.  First,  a  broad  trade  reform took  place  during  the  period  under  analysis
(1985-1990), so it is possible to  study  the pattern  of changes in protection.  Second,
Mexico was a  country  with  a  significant and  growing share  of FDI.  Third,  unlike
most  of the  evidence on the  political  economy literature,  so far,  Mexico was not  a
member  of GATT,  so it had  freedom in tariff-setting  well beyond  that  available for
GATT  members.  Finally  a panel  data  base of manufacturing  firm is available  so it
is possible to measure relatively  accurately, indicators  of market  structure  recognized
to be important  in the  determination  of the demand for protection.
The results show that  FDI was a significant player in the determination  of Mexico's
tariff structure.  The data  suggest that  if the presence of FDI in itself tended  to lower
tariffs, this was not true for import-competing  sectors.  Import-competing  sectors with
large  shares  of FDI  tended  to  be over-protected.  However, this  has  been  (partially)
corrected  during the  trade  policy reform and it appears  that  in 1990 the influence of
FDI on tariff structure  is almost negligible.
ii1  Introduction
The  political  economy literature  is increasingly  called upon  to  help  gain  a  better
understanding  of the  pattern  of protection.'  For example,  it  predicts  that  highly
concentrated  sectors  will obtain  higher  levels of protection,  as free-riding  by  firms
lobbying  for protection  is  easier to  overcome in small  groups.  Similarly, declining
industries  will receive higher levels of protection  as the opportunity  cost of lobbying
is lower in a slow-growing industry  than  in a dynamic sector.  These and other predic-
tions  of the  political  economy literature  have been tested  on cross-section  data  sets
for manufacturing  activities  in developed economies. 2
This  empirical  literature  usually  concentrates  on  the  role of different  domestic
pressure  groups in the determination  of protection.  However, with  the increasing im-
portance  of Foreign Direct Investment  (FDI),  pressures arising from the participation
of foreign groups in lobbying should be taken into account.3 Arguably, such pressures
are likely  to  be  particularly  important  in  the  manufacturing  sectors  of developing
countries where FDI  is  sizeable.4 Focusing on the role of FDI may help obtain  a more
complete picture  of the political-economy  determinants  of protection  for at least two
reasons.  First,  there  is a tradition  in the  development literature  that  gives a promi-
nent role to FDI  in the  process of industrialization. 5 Second, the role of FDI has long
'In  this  paper,  'pattern  of  protection'  and  'tariff  structure'  are  used  interchangeably.  In  the
presence  of quantitative  restriction,  as was the  case in Mexico during  the  period  under  examination
(see below),  this  could be  misleading.  However due to the  lack of trade  elasticity  estimates,  it is not
possible  to obtain  price equivalents  from  quantitative  restriction  and  we therefore  omit  these  from
the  analysis.
2The  surveys  by  Ray  (1990),  Rodrik  (1995),  Magee  (1997)  review  the  main  findings  of  this
literature.  It  should  be  noted  that  the  bulk  of evidence is for developed  countries  that  have  their
tariffs  tied,  as  a  result  of  their  GATT  membership.  This  seriously  limits  the  usefulness  of the
predictions  derived  from  these  studies,  since tariff  reductions  have followed,  with  few exceptions,
straight  line formulas  that  apply  for all countries.
3FDI  has been  increasing  at  an  average of 15% during  the  last  decade.
'Inflows  of FDI into developing  countries have increase from an average share of 0.7% of developing
countries'  GDP  in 1985 to  4.5% in  1997.  Mexico is no exception.  During  the  same period  the  ratio
of FDI stock  to GDP  went  from  3.8% to  7.1% (OECD  (1997).
5For  some,  FDI  provides  the  stimulus  for  acquiring  and  mastering  new  technologies,  thereby
providing  positive  externalities,  while for others  it is an impediement  to industrialization  as its  only
1been recognized  in the  trade  literature.  In recognition  of the  importance  of  FDI,  a
trade-theoretic  literature  has developed starting  in the late eighties  with  Bhagwati's
(1987) concept of quid pro quo FDI,  which takes place in anticipation  of tariff increases
in the host country  and can potentially  diffuse the threat  of protection.6 SimilarLy,  in
a political-economy  setup,  Hillman and Ursprung (1993) show that  tariff-jumping  FDI
can result in lower levels of protection  at equilibrium,  even in cases where FDI lobbies
for protection  and  its  lobby technology  is as efficient as the technology  of domestic
firms.
So far,  these theoretical  predictions  have only been tested  on the US, where  quid
pro quo FDI is more likely to occur than  in developing countries.7 Also, the US tariff.
like that  of other  developed countries, has been bound  by the GATT for a long time.
with tariff reductions  taking  place in a multilateral  context  according to straight  line
formula reductions,  making it difficult to discern the effects of pressure-group  activity
on trade-policy  formulation.  At the same time, there  is little evidence for developing
countries  where the  problem of tariff-binding has not  arisen, at least  until recently.
This paper looks for further  evidence on the potential  effects of FDI on trade-policy
formulation.  It  also provides  as a case study  in a  developing-country  context  where
quid  pro  quo  FDI  is likely to  be  less important. 8 The  evidence is for the  Mexican
manufacturing  sector during  the period  1985-1990. A Mexican case study  is relevant
for at least  four reasons.  First,  a broad  trade  reform took  place  during  this  period,
purpose is to take advantage of cheap labor and establish dominant positions in the host country's
market. The debate is covered in Helleiner  (1989).
6The influence  of quid pro quo FDI on tariffs and welfare is also examined in Bhagwati, Brecher,
Dinopolous and  Srinivisan (1987), Bhagwati, Dinopolous and Wong (1992), and  Grossman and
Helpman (1994).
7The empirical  literature agrees on the fact that trade policy is an important determinant of FDI
in the US, Europe and Japan,  but there is little evidence that  quid pro quo FDI  has successfully
reduced protection. For empirical evidence,  using different and interesting methodologies,  see Azrak
and Wynne (1995), Barrell and Pain (1999), Belderbos (1997), Blonigen and Feenstra (1996), and
Blonigen and Figlio (1998).
'One  exception is Kraemer (1995), which also focuses on the Mexican  trade policy reform. Krae-
mer concludes  that  the weight of foreign investors in an industry is of no importance for the sectoral
structure of liberalization. The methodology  used in this study is different  from the one in Kraemner's,
as discussed in section 3.
2so it  is possible  to  analyze  the  pattern  of changes in  protection.  Second,  Mexico
was a  country  with  a  significant  and  growing share  of  FDI.  Third,  unlike most  of
the  evidence  on the  political  economy literature  so far,  Mexico was not  a member
of GATT,  so it  had  freedom  in  tariff-setting  well beyond  that  available for  GATT
members.  Finally,  a  panel  data  base  of manufacturing  firms  is  available,  so it  is
possible  to  measure  relatively  accurately,  indicators  of market  structure  recognized
to  be important  in the determination  of the  demand for protection.
To anticipate  the  main  results,  it  turns  out  that  the  correlates  of tariff  changes
in  Mexican manufacturing  protection  during  the  period are broadly  consistent  with
the  view that  FDI  is an  important  "political  economy factor"  along the  lines that
would  be predicted  by the recent  literature  on endogenous  protection.  That  is, the
presence of FDI  generally  leads to  lower tariffs.  However, whether  FDI  occurs  in an
import-competing  or export-oriented  sector should also matter.  Once we control for
FDI  trade-orientation,  it turns  out that  import-competing  sectors with large shares of
FDI  tend to be more protected  than  import-competing  sectors with no FDI.  This 'bias'
in the structure  of protection  structure  was (partially)  corrected  during  the Mexican
trade  policy reform.
Section 2 discusses briefly Mexican trade  policy reform during  the period covered
by the study.  Section 3 reviews the theoretical  predictions from the endogenous trade-
policy literature,  emphasizing  the  role of FDI.  Using the influence-driven  approach,
we show  that  the  usual  prediction  in  the  literature  (namely  that  tariff  levels and
FDI  should  be negatively  correlated),  which is not borne  out  by the  evidence, is not
robust.  Section 4 describes the model specification, while section 5 reports  the results.
Section 6 concludes.
32  Mexican  trade  policy  reform
Following the 1982 debt crisis, new trade  restrictions  were introduced,  and both  trade
and  FDI  plunged  (in  1984, total  trade  was 40 percent  below its  1980 level, and  FDI
declined by 50 percent).  Trade  policy reform started  in 1985 with  an  important  cut
in quantitative  restrictions  (import-licensing  mainly).  It was followed by a first round
of tariff reduction  in April  1986 (according to  Mexico's  GATT  accession)  and  com-
pleted  by a (before-schedule)  second round  in December  1987 (Economic  Solidarity
Pact).  Since then, until 1990, the structure  of protection  remained almost unchanged.
Thus Mexico's trade  and  FDI policies were sharply  reoriented towards  more openness
starting  in the mid-eighties  and  during the period covered by this  study.
Indicators  of the magnitude  of the trade reforms for manufacturing  during  1985-90
appear  in table  1.  They  suggest that  reduction  in protection  in manufacturing  was
swift and  drastic.  In less than  three  years,  both  quantitative  and  tariff restrictions
were  substantially  reduced,  as  well as  their  dispersion.9 However, the  impact  on
imports  was delayed, as the import  penetration  ratio only increased  after  1988. This
lagged response was partly  due to weak demand,  reflected by production  levels below
their  long run  trend.  It  was also the consequence of the  strong  real  depreciation  of
the Mexican peso during  1986-1987 which allowed domestic producers  to adjust  more
smoothly  to the new exposure  to international  competition.
INSERT  TABLE 1 HERE: GLOBAL TRENDS  IN MEXICAN
MANUFACTURING:  1984-1990.
The regulatory  environment  traditionally  discouraged  FDI in most industries,  with
minority  participation  restrictions  and  prior  authorization  from  the  central  govern-
ment.  Reforms began in 1986, with the initiation  of debt-to-equity  conversion schemes
and the exemption  of small to medium levels of investment from government approval
9The reduction  in effective protection  was also substantial  (close to  50 percent  on average  when
comparing  the  1984-1985 period  to the  1986-1987 period).
4for foreign majority  participation.  Total  FDI  inflows (primarily  to  manufacturing)
correspondingly  increased,  although  they dropped  again in  1988 with  the end of the
debt-to-equity  swaps program.  However, the  trend  was soon reversed again  in 1989
with  the  adoption  of a new law, which eased substantially  the  regulatory  obstacles
to  foreign investment.10 Given the  change in trade  policy  and  the  perspective  of a
NAFTA  agreement,  it  is clear that  this  new generation  of  FDI was no longer of the
tariff-jumping  type,  but  rather  outward-oriented,  as illustrated  by the  case of the
maquiladoras. 11
Close consultation  with  business  has been  a  key factor  in  the  re-orientation  of
Mexico's  trade  policy.  The  GATT  (1993) trade  policy review of Mexico reports  a
high level of cooperation  and  linkage between  the  government  and  the  private  sec-
tors  through  entities  such  as the  Coordinating  Body for Foreign  Trade  Entreprises
(COECE).  There  is also strong evidence of lobbying during  the reform period,  as re-
ported  by Kraemer  (1995).  A survey by Story Mexican Businessman  in 1986 reports
that  80 percent  of Mexican industrialists  turn  to  their  industrial  association  when
trying  to  influence a public-policy  decision and  only 3 percent  think  it is useless to
attempt  to influence policy by any means.  Moreover, the same survey classifies trade
protection  as  the  policy  that  can be  more easily  influenced.  Presumably  then,  in-
dustrialist  lobbies had  an important  influence in the determination  of Mexican trade
policy. But were owners of foreign capital  also important  players in the determination
of Mexican trade  policy and,  if so, in which direction  did they  affect it?
'0 Majority  investment  in  nonrestricted  sectors  was eligible  to  receive  automatic  approval  if it
met  six clearly  defined criteria  (e.g.,  capital  originates  outside  Mexico, satisfaction  of existing  envi-
ronmental  regulations,  etc...)  Limited  access to the  Mexican  stock  market  was permitted  through
special trust  funds.  Automatic  approval was granted  if the National  Foreign Investment  Commission
failed to reach  a decision  within  45 days.
"Note  that  in  our  empirical  analysis  trade  and  industrial  data  is  corrected  for  maquiladoras
activities,  as these  are clearly  under  a different  regime that  the  rest  of the  economy.
53  Predictions  of the  endogenous  protection  litera-
ture
As suggested  by Magee, Brock  and Young (1989), it is useful to  view-policy choices
as being determined  in  a political  "market"  in which the  choice of policy  plays the
same role as prices in an  ordinary  market.  An equilibrium  is reached  when policies
have  been  adjusted  to  the  point  where  the  marginal  value  of  resources  spent  by
opposing parties  is equal.  In practice,  however, how those  who seek protection  and
how those who oppose it exert their influence, and hence the outcome, depends  on the
institutional  context  or supply side of the market  which is usually treated  summarily
in the  literature.  Fortunately,  as we are concentrating  on the  pattern  of protection
across sectors,  the institutional  context  is less important  as it presumably  affects all
sectors more or less equally.'2
3.1  Endogenous  tariffs  in  the  presence  of  FDI
Much  of the  theoretical  literature  on  endogenous  tariffs  in  the  presence  of  FDI  is
theoretical  and predicts  generally that  the presence of FDI should  lead to lower levels
of tariffs regardless of the approach  (trade-theoretic  or political-economy).  To begin
with,  on welfare grounds  and  in imperfectly  competitive  markets  (markets  in which
FDI is more likely to occur as suggested by Diaz-Alejandro,  1970 or Markusen,  1995),
the presence of foreign capital  reduces the rationale  for tariffs based on profit-shifting
to domestically-based  firms.  If foreign-owned firms repatriate  their profits,  then there
is no reason  to  try  to  shift profits  to domestically  based  firms.  In the  extreme  case
where all domestically-based  firms are foreign-owned, the case for protection  reduces
Hllelpman  (1995) shows  that the predictions  from the political  economy literature are quite robust
to model selection -e.g.  the political-support function, direct or representative democracy, the tariff
formation model, or the influence-driven approach- so that in discussing predictions, one need not
distinguish competing approaches. Rather, it is useful to distinguish tariff-formation in the presence
of, and in the absence of FDI.  The brief review below serves to place into perspective the empirical
results.For  a  comprehensive  review of the  literature,  see Rodrik  (1995) or  Magee  (1997).
6to the usual  terms-of-trade  argument."3
Next,  in  models  where  FDI  participates  in the  decision-making  process through
lobbying, it has been shown that  the presence of FDI is likely to lead to lower tariffs.
Hillman and  Ursprung  (1993) argue that  even in the case of circumventing  FDI where
foreign  firms  lobby  for  protection,  the  outcome  is  likely to  imply  a  lower level of
protection.  This  is because when FDI  rises, import  competition  is reduced,  as foreign
firms now sell from the host  country. This,  in turn,  reduces the gain to national  firms
from protectionist  policies in their home market.  Competition  now comes from inside
the border.  Thus, the incentive of national  firms to contribute  for protection  is lower
and,  therefore,  the entry  of FDI may result in lower levels of protection.14
In a trade-theoretic  context,  Bhagwati  (1987) and  Bhagwati  et al.  (1987) intro-
duced the notion of quid pro quo FDI (quid pro quo FDI is motivated  by a protectionist
threat  in the  host  country),  and  showed that  it helps  defuse protectionist  pressures
through  several channels  (see Bhagwati,  Dinopoulos  and  Wong  (1992)).  First,  FDI
can buy goodwill from the host country government and, therefore,  reduce protection
through  its  supply  side.  Second, it can co-opt labor  unions and  weaken their  incen-
tives to lobby for protection  'to  save jobs'.  Third,  'anti-foreign-bashing'  can be built
by obtaining  visibility through  FDI.  Fourth,  it may co-opt the host country firms that
seek to  lobby  for protection  (directly  through  joint-ventures  with  domestic  firms or
indirectly  by participating  in industrial  lobbying)."5  Thus  for all the  above reasons
one would expect  that:
* the  larger  is the  share  of FDI,  the lower the  tariff.
"See Dick (1993), Lee (1990) and Olarreaga (1996).
"'This implicitly assumes that domestic and foreign firms share the same lobbying technology (or,
more accurately, that foreign firms do not have a better  lobbying  technology). Also,  the government
is as sensitive to foreign firms as to domestic firms.
" 5However,  the effect of quid pro quo FDI  on protection is not as clear as suggested above. Gross-
man and Helpman (1994b) showed  that quid pro quo FDI  does not necessarily  result in lower tariffs.
Bhagwati, Dinopoulos and Wong (1992) suggest that  quid pro quo FDI  may also be perceived as a
threat  by the host government and may therefore lead to higher protection.
7The  empirical  literature  on quid  pro  quo  FDI  and  tariff  formation  is small  and
restricted  to  FDI in the  US. Azrak  and  Wynne  (1995) using industrial  data,  showed
that  Japanese  FDI in the US is sensitive to  the probability  that  an  antidumping  duty
will be  imposed  (i.e., expected  increase in protection);  but  they  do not  test  for the
effect of this  FDI on tariffs in  the  us.  Blonigen and  Feenstra  (1997) confirm Azrak
and  Wynne's  finding, but  also look at the effects of  FDI on tariffs.  They find nmixed
evidence for the protectionist  diffusion effect of quid pro quo FDI at the industry  [evel.
Blonigen and  Figlio (1998) also found the same result  using a different methodology.
By focusing directly on the voting behavior of senators in the US, Blonigen and Figlio
found that  legislators who leaned towards free trade  relaxed their  protectionist  stance
after the entry of FDI.  On the other hand, legislators who were initially  protectionists.
toughened  their  protectionist  positions  after  the entry of  FDI.
Unlike the theoretical  literature  that  appears  unanimous,  the empirical  literature
gives elusive evidence on the  effects of  FDI  on tariff levels.  Thus  one is brought  to
question the robustness  of that  prediction.  Below, we develop several arguments  that
suggest a positive correlation  between  FDI  share  and tariff levels.
3.1.1  Can  FDI  lead  to  higher  tariffs?
There at least two reasons why, in developing countries tariffs may be higher in sectors
with  large shares  of  FDI.  First,  owners of foreign capital  (i.e., FDI)  may have access
to a better  lobbying technology.  One can imagine that  multinational  companies have
a larger experience of lobbying in different countries which they can adapt  to the host
government.  Second,  governments  may  be  more sensitive  to  FDI  interests  than  to
the interests  of nationals.  This may be so for several second-best  arguments  ranging
from the fact that  foreign companies may be more credible in the lobbying game than
domestic producers  (e.g., due to financial constraints  domestic producers  cannot  keep
their promises),  to the perception  that  FDI brings technology spillovers. For these and
other  reasons,  governments  may be  more receptive  to  FDI demands,  as notably  has
8been the  case recently  when several Eastern  European  countries  negotiated  bilateral
trade  agreements with the EU. The automobile sector in Mercosur countries provides
another  example of a highly protected  industry  with  a significant presence of  FDI.
To simplify, focus on the case where the government is more sensitive to demands
from  owners  of foreign  capital  than  from  owners of domestic  capital.  Even  then,
somewhat surprisingly, this is not enough to result in higher tariffs in sectors with large
shares  of  FDI.  As will be  shown below, the weight given to  FDI in the  government's
objective  function  needs to  be larger than  the sum of the weights given to  owners of
domestic  capital  and to  social welfare for this  to happen  .
Take the following familiar  setup from the  Grossman and  Helpman (1994) frame-
work.  Assume a small open economy with n sectors producing with a constant  returns
to scale technology employing sector-specific capital and intersectorally  mobile labour.
Sector specific capital  can be domestic or foreign-owned. Sector 0 employs only labour
under  constant  returns  to  scale.  Thus  the  productivity  of labour  in sector  0 deter-
mines the equilibrium  wage.  Good 0 serves as numeraire.  Consumers  have identical
and additive  quasi-linear  utility  function.  The utility  function  is quasi-linear in good
0.  This  allows to  abstract  from  income and  substitution  effects in the  consumption
of goods which are produced  employing foreign capital.
The lobbying game is a la Grossman and Helpman where owners of sector-specific
capital  in  each sector  (domestic  and  foreign) face the  government  with  a 'truthful'
contribution  function  conditioned  on the domestic price in their  sector  (i.e, the world
price plus the  tariff)."6 Truthfulness  implies that  in the  neighbourhood  of the  equi-
librium,  the  derivatives of the sector contribution  with respect  to  the domestic  tariff
is equal to the derivative of the profit function  with respect  to the tariff; i.e., the mar-
ginal cost of a tariff increase  should be equal to its marginal  benefit for the  lobbying
" 6To simplify, unlike Grossman and Helpman (1994), we assume that  lobbies ignore the effect of
trade protection on the cost of living. Combined with previous assumptions allows us to treat the
multiple-principal problem in Grossman and Helpman as several principal-agency  problems that can
be solved independently.
9group." 7 Owners of domestic  and foreign capital  share the same lobbying technology,
but  lobby through  different groups.'8 The government's  objective  function  combines
political  contributions  and  national  social welfare.  The  latter  reflects government's
concern for the  average voter.  Thus,  the government's  problem  can be written  as
max V(t)  C(t)  +  3C*(t)  + aW(t)  (1)
where  C  =  C* are  the  contribution  functions  of domestic  and  foreign-owned firms
respectively  (all variables  refering to  owners of foreign firms will be  denoted  with  a
'*');  t  is the  tariff vector;  W is social welfare; (x is the  weight given to social welfare
in  the  government's  objective  function  and  is the  weight given to  foreign  firms'
contributions  in the government's  objective function.
Given the  above simplifying  assumptions,  there  are n first-order  conditions  that
can be solved independently.  Thus, using the truthfulness  property of the contribution
function,  yields the following implicit expression for the optimal  tariff in sector i
19V  a7r  97*  aw
Ati  =  t  +  0ti  +  ati  (2) atj  atj  at,  t
where  7w  and  7r*  are profits  of domestic  and foreign firms respectively.  Recalling the
small  country  assumption,  which  implies  that  &pilati = 1,  and  using  Hotelling's
lemma, equation  (2) becomes
at  =  i + 0  ati  (3)
"For  a discussion  of truthful  equilibrium in this context, see Bernheim and Whinston (1986).
18This assumption which adds to the clarity of the exposition can be relaxed without modifying
the results.
10The expression for the  change in welfare following a tariff increase is given in the
appendix.  Note that  it only includes  nationals'  interests,  i.e., it excludes the  change
in foreign firms'  profits.  It  is given by:
aw  =-Y  + ti  __  (4)
at.  z  Y*  ti
where mi are imports.  Substituing  (4) into  (3) and solving for ti yields the optimal
tariff, t
yi + !Ytt - QeJt  (5)
all  1 a17ti  11(5
where  llzli  stands  for the  absolute  value of z.  Defining yT =  yi + y* as total  output
in sector i and rearranging  (5), it yields
tj  Y  i1  + Si(o I  3  E)]  (6)
where sz is the  share of output  produced  by foreign-owned capital.  The term  outside
the  square  brackets  in  (6) is the  optimal  Grossman-Helpman  tariff  in the absence of
foreign firms.  The  second  term  in squared  brackets  captures  the  effects of foreign
firms' lobbying on the  determination  of the optimal  tariff.
Proposition  The optimal  tariff in sector Z will increase with the share of  FDI in sector
i  if and  only if the  weight  given  to  FDI political  contributions  in  the government's
objective  function  is  larger  than  the  sum  of  the  weights  given  to  domestic  firms
11contributions  plus  social  welfare.
Proof.  From (6) note that  aii/las  > 0 - ,  > 1 + or.  x-
If the  government  gives the  same weight to  foreign firms'  political  contributions
as to  domestic firms,  i.e.  3 =  1, then tariffs would be negatively  correlated  with the
share of FDI.  This is so because the income of owners of foreign capital  does not enter
the national  welfare function which in turn  gives incentives to the government to have
lower tariffs  in  sectors  with  large shares  of  FDI,  based  on relative  welfare effects." 9
Note also that  the fact that  the government gives more weight to foreign firms than  to
domestic firms' political  contributions  is not a sufficient condition for tariffs to increase
with the share of FDI.  The reason for this is that  domestic firms' profits enter twice in
the  government's  objective  function;  first  through  contributions  and  second through
social welfare, whereas foreing firms profits enter only through  political  contributions.
Finally,  if the  government  does not  distinguish  between  domestic  and  foreign firms
and includes foreign firm's  profits in its welfare function, then  the share of FDI would
have no effect on the tariff level, i.e.  :  =  1 + a.
3.1.2  Does  FDI  trade-orientation  matter?
Is FDI in export-competing  sectors going to affect tariff formation  in the same way as
FDI  in  import  competing  sectors?  This is a pertinent  question, especially for Mexico
with its  proximity  to  the  US market.  To our  knowledge,  there  is no  evidence  on  this.
We address  the issue  by using an  interacting  term  between  net  import-penetration
(nm/yT)  and  the share  of  FDI  (s*) in each sector.  The net  import-penetration  ratio
(imports  minus  exports  divided  by  output)  is  an  indicator  of 'revealed  comparative
disadvantage'  that  serves  as  a  proxy  for  a  sector's  trade  orientation. 2 0 FDI  trade-
'9For similar results  in a general-equilibrium  trade-theoretic  framework,  see Bhagwati  and  Brecher
(1980),  Bhagwati  and  Tironi  (1980),  Schweinberger  and  Vosgerau  (1997) and  Olarreaga  (1998).
20Bowen (1983) shows that  revealed  comparative  advantage  indicators  should  be  normalised  by
production  and  not  total  trade  for theortical  consistence.
12orientation  can then  be proxied by:
mFDI  =  (-n  X)/yT  *  s*  = nm/yT  *  s*  (7)
where  nFDI  is the  interacting  variable, m  is the level of imports,  x is the level of
exports,  yT  is total  output  and s* is the share  of output  produced  by foreign firms. 21
A positive sign for mFDI  in the tariff equation  estimated  in the empirical  section
will imply  that  sectors  which are import  competing  (i.e, have a comparative  disad-
vantage)  and  where there  is an important  presence of  FDI,  will  tend  to  have higher
tariffs.  And this  by proposition  1 will suggest that  the weight given to foreign firms
political  contributions  in the government's  objective function  is higher than  the sum
of the weights given to domestic  firms political  contributions  and  social welfare.
3.2  Other  determinants  of  the  patterns  of  protection
With  the few exceptions  noted  above, the empirical  literature  has neglected  the  role
of  FDI  and has concentrated  on the determinants  discussed below.  These,  and  some
theoretical  arguments  (also briefly reviewed below), are relevant for the Mexican case
and  are included  in the  empirical specification.  To justify  the empirical  specificat;ion
below and place our findings in perspective,  we note the following:
* Protection  having  the  characteristics  of a  public  good,  and  contributions  to
lobbying being voluntary,  organizational  costs will be an  increasing function  of
group  size. Hence tariffs should be positively  correlated  with  industry  concen-
tration. 2 2
21Foreign  firms  are  here  defined  as  those  with  more  than  10% of  foreign  capital.  We use  an
alternative  definition  at  a 50% foreign equity share  and  results  in table  2 were qualitatively  robust.
22Note however, that  the  theoretical  literature  is divided on this.  Cornes  and  Sandler  (1996) argue
that  as size of the group  increases,  this  may also result  in higher contributions  by the  group.  Hillman
(1991) argues  that  the  theory  on lobbying and  size group  is not  well-founded  in empirical  measures
of industry  concentration.  Yet, surveys of the empirical  literature  suggest  this  is a robust  result  (see
13* If labor unions are well organized, 23 industries with significant shares of em-
ployment will obtain higher wages and be more protected. 24
* Large sectors will have more political weight. Regulators will be sensitive to
the size of the  sector.  Moreover,  the lower the import-penetration ratio (im-
ports  over output),  the  lower the relative weight of consumers compared to
producers in the government's  objective  function. 25 Thus, the lower  the import-
penetration ratio (net imports over output), the higher the rate of protection.
For a theoretical justification, see Grossman and Helpman (1994a).  Rodrik
(1995) challenges  this result on empirical grounds (see Anderson, 1980).
* Declining industries tend  to  obtain more protection  (see Hillman, 1982, or
Brainard and Verdier, 1994). In a dynamic context, the  'compensation effect'
predicts that  declining  industries (slow-growing)  will lobby more as the oppor-
tunity cost of lobbying will be lower.  This suggests that  import-penetration
ratios should be positively correlated with changes in tariffs.
* Labor intensive sectors tend to be more protected than capital intensive sectors
(see for example, Finger and Harrison, 1994 or the survey by Rodrik, 1995).
There is no clear theoretical explanation for this phenomenon. 26
D  The institutional  context.  In Mexico firms are legally obliged to join chamr-
bers that  are either industry or region-specific. If firms in a specific  industry
are spread across all the country, then their influence over the  government's
Rodrik,  1995 Magee, 1997, or Bilal,  1998).
23And there  is evidence that  they  were in Mexico. COPARMEX is the  employer's  confederation  and
had  strong  influence on  government's  decisions as reported  by Kraemer  (1995).
24Kruger  and  Summers  (1987) find strong  evidence for the  US. and  for a theoretical  justification,
see Cadot  et  al.  (1997).
25To see this,  note  that  m/y  =  (c - y)/y  =  c/y  - 1, where  m denotes  imports  (or net  imports),  c
is consumption- and  y is the  level of production.
26Rodrik (1995)  argues  that  in  cross-country  regressions,  this  result  may  capture  the  fact  that
labor  abundant  countries  tend  to  be poor  countries  with  important  government  revenue  constraint
leading  them to impose higher tariffs.  But  this does not explain  the results  in a cross-section  context.
14decision-making  process  should be  higher  as they  would exert  their  influence
through  different  associations  (chambers).  Moreover,  all trade  legislation  in
Mexico has to  be approved by the Senate,  implying that  some geographic  clis-
persion may help to defend the interest of an industry.27 An index of geographic
concentration  should then be negatively correlated  with  tariffs.
4  Empirical  specification
The politically-determined  tariff equation  is given by:
ti,t = f [Hi,t, k/lfi,t,  Ai,t,  nm/yi,tl  i\'/Zt,  Gi,  MDi,t, mMDi,t]  (8)
+  - +  -+  - ?  ?
where the signs under  the variables summarize the previous  discussion.  In, (8), ti,t is
tariff in sector i at  period  t, H  is the Herfindal index of firm concentration,  (k/t)  is
the  capital  labor  ratio,  A stands  for the  share  of labor  in each sector,  nm/yT  is the
import penetration  ratio  defined in (7), LXnm/yT  is the change in import  penetration,
G is an  indicator  of geographic concentration  (which is time-invariant)  and  s* is the
share of output  produced  by firms with  at least  10 percent  of foreign capital,  mFDI
is the interacting  term  between import  penetration  and share of FDI defined in  (7).28
Data  are  described  in  the  appendix.  The  time-period  covers  1985 to  1990 and
is for the  2-digit  Mexican National  Account Manufacturing  Categories  (39 sectors),
with some aggregation  due to incompatibility  with  trade. data.
Estimation  of such an equation  is prone  to endogeneity  problems  as FDI  may be
due to tariff-jumping  or to  high price-cost margins in some sectors,  which themselves
27As put by Rogowski  (1987): "When automakers or dairy farmers entirely dominate twenty s,mall
constituencies and are a powerful minority in fifty more, their voice will certainly be heard in the
nation's  council."
280ther  variables  were included  in previous  regression,  such  as the  share  of output  sold to other
sectors  (intermediate  production),  but  were dropped  due to statistical  insignificance.
15may  be  due  to  high  tariffs.  Also, the  labor  share  in  sector  Z may  depend  on  tariff
levels and  the presence  of  FDI  in  that  sector.  Therefore,  equation  (8) is estimated
jointly  with  the following equations:29
s*t  =  f[tit,  ti,t_i.,  pcmi,t,  Hi,t,  Gi,  wagei,t]  (9)
?  +  +  +  - _
Ai,t  =  f[ti,t,  s*t,  Hi,t, G,  wagei,t,  Yi,t ]  (10)
+  ?  +i  +
pcrni,t  =  f[ti,t,  Hi,t,  Gi,  (k/yT )i,t,  peni,t]  (11)
+  +  +  +_
where  the  signs  below  the  variables  will be  discussed  shortly.  In  the  above
equations,  pcm  is  the  price-cost  margin,  wage  is  the  average  wage  rate,  k/yT  is
the  capital-output  ratio,  y  is the  share  of output  of sector  i  in  the  economy  and
pen =  m/(y  + x - m)  is the import  penetration  ratio. 30
According to the discussion above, we expect tit to enter positively  in (10) and in
(11) as a higher tariff should increase both  the labor share and the price-cost  margin.
The sign of tit in (9) should be positive if FDI  is of the tariff-jumping  type.  The lagged
tariff is also expected to enter positively into the  FDI  equation  as high tariffs in period
t - 1  may be  positively  correlated  with expected  increases in tariffs (as suggested  by
Blonigen and  Feenstra,  1996).  If  FDI  is of the  quid  pro quo type  then  an  expected
increase  in protection  should lead to higher levels of  FDI.3 "  The  sign of the share  of
FDI in the labour equation  would also depend on the type of foreign direct investment.
29The inclusion of an import-equation  (as in Trefier,  1993) would have been desirable,  but  no data
on import  prices  were  available.  However, we performed  a Hausman-Wu  exogeneity  test  over the
whole panel  and  we could  not  reject  at  the  hypothesis  that  nm/yT  is exogenous  even for very low
levels of confidence (H=0.27).  This  may be due to the fact  that  we use net  import  penetration  ratio
as the  explanatory  variable  and  not  the  classic import-penetration  ratio.
30Alternative  specifications  were estimated  and  are discussed  in the  next  section.
3 "This  is probably  a very rough  proxy  for expected  increases in protection  and  one should  ideally
work with  anti-dumping  investigation  data  as  Azrak  and  Wynne  (1995) or  Blonigen  and  Feenstra
(1997) did for the  US. The  constraint  here is that  Mexico had  no anti-dumping  authority  before 1986
and only ratified Article  VI of the GATT in March 1988. By 1990 only 19 anti-dumping  investigation
were concluded  which  leaves  us with  very few non-zero  observations  to  carry  out  any  econometric
analysis.
16The price-cost  margin  should enter  positively in the  FDI  equation  as high profits
should attract  more FDI.  Industry-concentration,  H, should also enter positively intlo
the  FDI equation  as this  may capture  the idea of potentially  lower levels of competi-
tion in the domestic market.  H is expected to enter negatively into the share of labor
equation  as the  share  of labor  is used as a proxy for labor union  strength,  and  it is
expected  that  high  levels of industry  concentration  should make labor  organization
more difficult as capital  owners will more easily oppose their  formation.  H  should
enter  positively  into the  price-cost  margin  equation  as industry  concentration  facil-
itates  price collusion  (implicit  or explicit).  The geographic-concentration  index,  GC,
should  enter negatively  in the  FDI equation,  as it is expected to  capture  competition
in factor  markets.  G should  enter  positively  in  the labor  share  equation,  since the
more geographically  concentrated  an  industry  is, the  easier it should  be to  organize
labor  unions.  Geographic  concentration  should also facilitate  collusive behaviour  by
firms and,  therefore,  we expect  a positive sign in the price-cost  margin  equation.
The  wage should  be  negatively  correlated  with  FDI  as sectors  with  lower wages
should  attract  FDI.  The correlation  with  labor-shares  should  be negative,  if one ex-
pects this  to capture  demand  for labor.  The share of output  (y) should be positively
correlated  with  labor  shares,  as a larger output  implies  a larger  labor  demand.  'Fi-
nally, the capital/output  ratio  (k/yT)  which serves as a proxy for capacity utilization
is expected  to  be positively  correlated  with  price-cost  margins  (pcm)  and  a  higher
exposure to international  competition  (i.e., high value for pen)  is expected to decrease
price-cost  margins.32
These  three  equations  attempt  to  resolve the  endogeneity  problems  mentionied
above.33 Moreover,  the  estimation  of an  FDI  equation  (equation  (9))  allows us  to
draw  some  conclusions  on  the  type  of  FDI  that  took  place  before  and  during  the
reform.
32See  Levinsohn  (1993).
33Note  that if FDI is endogenous,  then the interacting  term mf di is also  endogenous  and therefore
in regressions  we instrument  it by exogenous  variables  determining  fdi multiplied  by nm/yT.
17Equations  (9)-(11) are estimated  using a 3SLS technique,  which also helps control
for possible missing  exogenous variables.  All regressions are run  in  double-log form
(except  for the  two exogenous variables  that  can take negative  values (i.e., pen  and
nm/yT).
5  Results
We wish first  to identify  the extent  and the  direction in which FDI  affected Mexico's
tariff structure.  Second, we would also like to identify changes that  may have occurred
during  the trade  policy reform.  To answer these questions,  we report  first results  of
regressions for the  whole panel  1985-1990 (table  2).  This  allows us to  identify  the
effect  of  FDI  on Mexico's  tariff  structure.  To  capture  any  changes  that  may have
occured  during the reform, we estimated  the equations for two sub-panels,  1985-1987
and  1988-1990 to identify  any reform effects (table  3).34 We also ran  regressions for
the  two end-years,  1986 and  1990 (table  4) and  compared  results  again.  Finally,  as
regressions on levels at the end-period  may be affected by what happened  in the past,
we report  regression  results  both  for  differences over the  whole  panel  and  for  the
difference between 1986 and  1990 (table  5).
5.1  Determining  tariffs  in  Mexico:  1986-1990
The results  in  table  2 suggest that  Mexico's  tariff structure  significantly  reflects  in-
dustrial  lobbying  along the  lines discussed  above. 35 Indeed,  virtually  all variables
have the  expected  signs, most  of them  highly significant statistically.  For example,
industrial  concentration,  H, is highly correlated  with the tariff structure,  according to
340nly table  2 contains  results  for the four equations.  Tables 3 to 5 report  the  results for the  tariff
and FDI  equations  only.  The  other  results  are available  from the  authors.
35Results reported  in tables  2 to 5 do not  include  industry  or time  dummies.  However regression
run  including  dummies  are consistent  with  the ones  reported  in the tables.  Moreover, note  that  the
time-invariance  of G also captures  some of the  industry-specific  effects.
18theoretical  predictions.  Likewise, highly concentrated  sectors  tend  to  receive higher
tariffs.  Also, sectors  with  a  high capital/labor  ratio  (k/l)  receive lower protection,
corroborating  the  survey  findings reported  above according  to  which  entrepreneurs
believe that  trade  policy  is most  amenable  to  influence by  lobbying  activity.  The
labor union  proxy (A) is also highly significant suggesting  that  sectors that  are large
employers of labor tend to be more protected.  Moreover, declining sectors  (i.e., those
where the change in the import-penetration  ratio,  Anm/yT  has been large) also enjoy
larger tariffs.  Also, as predicted,  geographic concentration,  G, of an industry  tends  to
lead to lower levels of tariffs.  The only result at odds with the  a priori predictions  is
that  sectors with large import-penetration  ratios,  nm/yT,  enjoy higher tariffs, but  as
mentioned  earlier, this  seems to be an empirical regularity.  Overall, these preliminary
results  are surprisingly  coherent  and  consistent  with a priori expectations.
What  is the influence of FDI on Mexico's tariff structure?  Note first  that  the two
variables capturing  the effects of FDI  are very significant (99% level).  The coefficient
in front  of the  share  of output  produced  by foreign firms,  s*, is negative,  a  result
consistent  with  several explanations  offered in section 3.2.  Thus, at first sight,  in the
case of Mexico at least,  the presence of FDI leads to lower levels of protection.
As discussed earlier,  however, one would expect  that  FDI  trade-orientation  mat-
ters.  Recall that  the  import-penetration  ratio  controls  for the  trade-orientation  of
each sector,  but  it takes the  share of  FDI as given.  The interacting  term  (mFDir  =
nm/yT  * s*),  captures  simultaneously  the  effect of  FDI  and  its  trade-orientation.
The coefficient is positive  and highly significant statistically,  suggesting  that  import-
competing  sectors with large  FDI shares tend  to be more protected.  According to the
proposition  of section 3.1, this would suggest that  the weight given to foreign firms in
the government's  objective  function is higher than  the weight given to  social welfilre.
Of course, this  is only one, among several, possible interpretations  as the result  could
also be due to  a better  lobbying technology by foreign firms.36
36To test  for the  robustness  of results,  we ran regressions  without  including  the interacting  terms.
19INSERT  TABLE 2 HERE: MEXICO'S  TARIFF  STRUCTURE  1986-1990
What  kind  of FDI? The  FDI equation  tends  to suggest that  most  of Mexican FDI
is of the  tariff-jumping  type.  Sectors with  large tariffs tend  to have higher  levels of
FDI, as indicated  by the  positive  and  significant coefficient in front  of t.  Moreover,
the price-cost  margin, pcm,  also enters  positively in the  FDI equation,  and  it is itself
positively  and significantly correlated  with tariffs.  The lagged tariff  ,tt1,  is supposed
to be  a proxy for the expected  increase in protection  to try  to capture  quid pro  quo
FDI.  The coefficient turns  out  to  be significant, but  negative,  which raises  questions
as to  what  that  variable  is really  capturing.  Industry  concentration  ,H, also  seems
to  attract  FDI, whereas  geographic concentration  of an  industry  is not  an attracting
factor,  probably  due to factor  market  rivalry.  Finally, domestic relative  wages across
industries  do not  seem to  be  an  important  factor  in  attracting  FDI.  All the  other
variables turned  out  to have the expected sign (though some were insignificant),  with
the exception of the industry  concentration  indicator in the price-cost margin equation
and the  wage in the  labor equation.
So the  data  suggest  that  most  of Mexican  FDI was of the  tariff-jumping  type.
Sectors  with  large shares  of  FDI tend  to have lower tariffs.  However, if one controls
for FDI trade orientation,  it turns out that  import-competing  sectors with large shares
of  FDI were over protected.
The  next  section  focusses on the changes that  occured  during  the  reforms.  Has
FDI been an important  political  factor Was FDI in import-competing  sectors still over
protected  after the  reforms?
None of the  coefficients  change sign or significance, though the R2 value falls a little  because of
multicollinearity problems.  Moreover, as the number of observations is not very large, following
Belsley, Kuh  and Welsch (1980), we carry out  an outlier analysis over the  195 observations by
eliminating them one by one.  Again, none of the variables in the tariff equation change sign or
significance. Of course, when dropping one observation at  a time, one would miss the possibility
that  a combination of observations may be influential. However,  the results in table 3, where the
panel is subdivided into two  sub-panel containing 78 and 117  observations, show that the coefficients
in front of the two FDI variables do not change signs, nor do they loose statistical significance.  These
outlier tests suggest robustness of the results with respect to the data.
205.2  Determining  tariffs  during  the  reforms
Table 3 reports  results for the two sub-periods.  It can be seen that  they are consistentJ
with  results  for the  whole panel  in  table  3 (with  the  exception  that  the  change  in
import  penetration  did  not  seem to  be an influential  factor  during  the first period).
Some  coefficient values  change,  but  coefficients before and  after  the  reform  are  all
within one standard  error  deviation.37 Industrial  lobbying and  FDI  were significantly
correlated  with  the tariff structure  both  before and after the trade  policy reform.
INSERT  TABLE 3 HERE  MEXICO'S  TARIFF  STRUCTURE
1986-1987 and  1988-1990
The picture  changes, however, when we compare the two end-years in table  4. Now
both  industrialists'  lobbying and foreigners' lobbying were significant players in 1986
(results  consistent  with  those  reported  in  tables  2 and  3).  In  1990 however, results
change.  Industrial  lobbying captured  by industry  concentration,  H, the capital/labor
ratio,  k/l,  and  the  labor  union  proxy,A, are still  significant factors.  But  there  is a
significant drop in FDI influence on the tariff structure.  Indeed, the share of FDI  (s8)
becomes insignificant  and  the interacting  term  is only significant at the  90 %  level.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE: MEXICO'S  TARIFF  STRUCTURE:
1986 and  1990
As argued before, the fact  that  FDI  in import-competing  sectors  seems to  be still
over-protected  in  1990, may  only  reflect history.  Thus,  table  5 reports  results  in
first differences and  for the difference between  1985 and  1990 to  try  to capture  what
happened  with  FDI influence during the  reform.
To estimate  results  in first-differences we dropped  the  geographic  concentration
indicator  since it was time invariant.  We also dropped  the change in import  penetra-
tion,  because of difficulties interpreting  the results.
37By this  we mean  that  taking  one standard  deviation  up from the  coefficient with the  lower va.lue
we are within  one standard  deviation  down from the  coefficient with the  large value.
21Under  this  specification,  results  for the  difference between  1986 and  1990 sug-
gest that  capital/labor  ratios  were a significant determinant  of changes in  the tariff
structure  that  occurred  between  1985 and  1990.  Controlling  for  other  interve-ning
factors,  sectors  with an  increase in capital/labor  ratios experience increases in tariffs
(or smaller  decreases).  Surprisingly,  sectors  where the  share  of labor  had  increased
experienced  larger  decreases  in tariffs.  Sectors  which experience  a large increase  in
import  penetration  during  the period benefit from larger increases in tariffs.  Changes
in industry  concentration  do not seem to affect changes in the tariff structure.
INSERT  TABLE 5 HERE: CHANGES IN MEXICO'S  TARIFF  STRUCTURE
(log-differences)
The surprising  results  come from the effects of FDI on the tariff structure.  Sectors
where  the  share  of  FDI  increased,  experienced  larger  increases  in  tariffs  (or  lower
decreases in tariffs).3 8 However, changes in the inter-acting  term  do not affect changes
in tariff strcture.  This  suggest that  sectors,  where both  FDI and  import-penetration
have increased  si'multaneously did not  experience higher increases in tariffs, which, in
a way, is a correcting  step,  and  explains the fact that  the inter-acting  term  was only
significant at the 90 % level in  1990.
This  is further  confirmed  when regressions  are run  on first  log-differences.  The
explanatory  power  of the  regressions  is very  low, but  the  inter-acting  term  has  a
highly significant and negative  coefficient, which suggests that  the over-protection  of
FDI  before the  trade-policy  reform tended  to  be  partially  corrected.  Sectors  where
there  has  been  a large  increase  in FDI and  import-penetration  tended  to  experience
larger tariff reductions.
38This seem to rule out the possibility of quid pro quo fdi during the period.
226  Conclusions
The  correlates  of the  tariff  structure  for the  Mexican  manufacturing  sector  during
the turbulent  reforms  of the  second half of the eigthties,  are broadly  consistent  with
predictions  from  the  trade  literature  on endogenous  tariffs.  Subject  to  the  caveats
surrounding  any statistical  results from reduced-form equations  with less-than-perfect
proxies for the  variables,  the  possibility  of omitted  effects stemming  from  potential
mispecification,  and so on, it would appear  that  industrial  lobbying was an important
factor  in the  determination  of Mexico's tariff structure  and its  reform.
More importantly,  FDI  also seemed  to  be  a significant  player  in the  determina-
tion  of Mexico's  tariff  structure.  The  data  suggest  that  if the  presence  of  FD]I in
itself tended  to lower tariffs, this  was not true for import-competing  sectors:  import-
competing  sectors  with  large  shares  of  FDI  tended  to  be  over-protected.  However,
this has been (partially)  corrected during the trade-policy  reform and it appears  that
in 1990 the influence of FDI on tariff structure  is almost negligible.  So, to  answer the
question in  the title  of this  paper,  it seems that  FDI had  an important  influence on
Mexico's tariff structure  by obtaining  higher levels of protection  in import-competing
sectors,  but  this was, at least partially,  corrected  by the reform of the late  1980s.
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28Data  Sources
Data  on import  and  exports  were taken  from Casar  (1993).  Figures  on the  average
nominal  tariff  by sector  (weighted by output)  were provided  by Mexico's Secretaria
de Comercio y Fomento Industrial  (SECOFI,  1992) and data  on the domestically pro-
duced output  was taken from Mexico's Instituto  Nacional de Estadistica,  Geografia, e
Informatica  (INEGI,  various years).  All other data  used in calculations  were derived
from  an industrial  surveys performed  by INEGI covering a rough  70% of total  man-
ufacturing  value-added  (see Grether,  1997 for a detailed description  of data  selection
and treatment).  Data was reaggregated  to match the 39 industrial  categories used by
Casar  (1993).  Capital  stock  is estimated  at the  replacement  cost of its  componenl;s.
Labor units  are expressed  in terms of blue collar equivalent hours,  using the relative
wage to  convert  white  collar hours.  The  FDI share  corresponds  to  the  share  of out-
put  of those  firms whose social capital  was, in  1991, controlled  by more  than  10%
by foreign  ownership.  Finally,  following Audretsch  and  Feldman  (1993),  the  index
of geographic  concentration  is estimated  by a  Gini  coefficient relating  the  cumula-
tive regional  share in employment  in a particular  sector with  the cumulative  regional
share in total  manufacturing  employment  (regions correspond  to the 31 states  of the
Mexican Federation).
29Appendix:  Derivation  of welfare  effects
At any point, the economy is characterized by its income-expenditure  identity, namely
E(1,p, W) _ R(I,p, k, t) + T(p)  (12)
where  1 is the  price of the  numeraire,  E(.)  is nationals  expenditure  function  (i.e., it
excludes the expenditure  from onwers of specific capital.  R(.)  is the national  revenue
function, 39 k is the  vector  of n domestically-owned  specific factors,  and  T(.)  is tariff
revenue.
Differentiating  this  identity  with  respect  to  pi  and  letting  Ei  and  Ri  stand  re-
spectively for the  partial  derivatives  of the  expenditure  and  revenue functions  with
respect  to pi gives
aw  aT
Ei +Ew  RI +  (13)
aPi  api,
Let ci and  yi stand for nationals  consumption  and production  of good i. Rearranging
(13) and using Shephard's  and Hotelling's lemmas, and recalling that  Ew is the inverse
of the marginal  utility  of income which should be equal to one given our quasi-linear
utilitu  function  on the numeraire,  we have
_  =_  - ci + a  (14)
Dpi  apt-,
Now given the small country  assumption  we have that  Dpi  = ati.  Let us choose units
so that  all international  prices are equal to one; ti = Pi-1  is the tariff rate,  the specific
and  ad-valorem forms  being here identical  and api/&ti  = 1. Thus,  tariff revenue can
39The national  product  could be directly related  to Gross National Product  (i.e.  it excludes
revenue from foreign factors).
30be written as T(p) = >j ti mi(pi) (where mi are total imports in sector i), so that
AT  mi+  mj
a=  i  +  ~ti  t
where mi = ci-y  y,  where yf includes  production of both domestic and foreign-owned
firms; i.e. yT = Yi + y*. Substituting this into (14) gives
aw  +-t4±t  i
ati  Yi  ati
31Table 1
Global trends  in Mexican manufacturing:  1985-199Oa
1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990
import protectionb
average tariffc  26  24.3  17.3  10.6  12.6  12.5
dispersion of tariffs  25.5  18.0  11.8  7.9  6.0  6.3
coverage  of import licensesd  69.7  43.4  30.6  22.7  21.2  18.9
index of real exchange ratee  112.1  161.1  172.5  134.9  126.5  122.2
production, trade and FDI
production growthf  0.7  -4.6  -2.6  -1.6  2.9  6.1
import penetration rate  10  9  8  11  14  18
growth of total  FDI  inflows 9 25  210  113  -20  36  31
aSource:  Grether  (1997) and  Kessel and  Samaniego  (1992).
baverage between  the  June  and  December  values of each year
Cweigthed by production
daverage share  of commodity  categories  subject  to import  licensing  as  a percentage  of the  value
of the  category's  production.
e(197 0=100),  an  increase  means a real  depreciation  of the  Mexican  peso.
fpercentage  of deviation  from  the  predicted  value of a trend  fitted  over the  1980-1990 period.
qincluding  non-manufacturing  sectors.Table 2a
Mexico's tariff structure  1986-1990
tariff eq.  (t)  FDI eq.  (s*)  price-cost eq.  (prn)  labor  eq.  (A)
Constant  3.99***  4.03***  -1.76***  -3.01*
(.34)  (1.12)  (.28)  (1.59)
t  1.79**  .29***  1.00***
(.88)  (.09)  (.19)
tt_i  -2.08**
(.83)
s*  -.29***  .33***  .11





Anm/y  T  .07**
(.03)
H  .41 *  .40**  -.13*  -.80*
(0.09)  (0.10)  (0.05)  (0.15)
G  -.46**  -1.02***  -.38  .17















R2  0.23  0.15  0.21  .26
#  obs.  195  195  195  195
S.E.R  0.57  0.99  0.34  0.02
aEstimations  use a 3SLS.  Figures  in parenthesis  are heteroscedastic-consistent  standard errors
(White Robust). Data is available  from 1985,  but the presence  of  lagged  variables  lead  us to estimate
the system  of equations  from 1986. * is for significance  at the 90%  level, ** at the 95%  level  and
* **  at  the  99% level.Table 3a
Mexico's tariff structure:  1986-1987 and  1988-1990
1986-1987  1986-1987  1988-1990  1988-1990
tariff eq.  (t)  FDI eq.  (s*)  tariff eq.  (t)  FDI eq.  (s*)
Constant  5.34*  4.51***  3.91***  5.24*
(.55)  (1.16)  (.41)  (1.21)
t  .86  0.02
(.72)  (.76)
tt-1  -1  .3**  -1.07
(.64)  (.81)
8*  -.61***  -.28*
(.16)  (.10)
mFDI  1.  17***  1.36***
(.28)  (.30)
nm/yT  .50**w  .49*,*
(.19)  (.17)
Anm/yT  -.19  .48e*
(.03)  (.21)
H  .58s**  .47***  .36***  .45 *
(.09)  (.14)  (.10)  (.11)
G  -.79**  -1.07*  -.27  -1.26*w
(.37)  (.33)  (.22)  (.33)
kl  _-.  18*e*  -.20***
(.07)  (0.05)
A  .45**  .28*
(.05)  (.06)
pcm  1.43***  1.91*'**
(.27)  (.34)
wage  .50***  .17
(.26)  (.34)
R  2  0.21  0.33  0.17  .22
#  obs.  78  78  117  117
S.E.R  0.59  0.62  0.46  0.79
aEstimations  use  a  3SLS  over the  four  equations  (including  a  price-cost  margin  equation  and
a  labor  equation).  The  table  only reports  results  for the  tariff  and  the  FDI  equation.  Figures  in
parenthesis  are  heteroscedastic-consistent  standard  errors  (White  Robust).  * is for significance  at
the  90% level, ** at  the  95% level and  ***  at  the  99% level.Table 4a
Mexico's tariff structure:  1986 and  1990
1986  1986  1990  1990
tariff eq.  (t)  FDI eq.  (s*)  tariff eq.  (t)  FDI  eq.  (s*)
constant  4.74***  4.31***  3.67***  3.19**
(.61)  (1.33)  (.48)  (1.28)
t  .84  -.59
(.52)  (1.01)
tt_i  -.87*  -.52
(.41)  (1.35)
5*  -.58w  -.00
(.20)  (.11)
mFDI  .94*  .72*
(.39)  (.43)
nmr/y
T .83  .07
(.55)  (.28)
Anm/yT  -1.61  1.09
(1.58)  (.80)
H  .51***  .31**  .21*  .38**
(.20)  (.13)  (.12)  (.14)
G  -.89*  -.42  -.0  -1.21**
(.53)  (.41)  (.29)  (.49)
k/t  -.24***  -.23***
(.08)  (.08)
A  .41***  .23A**
(.11)  (.07)
pcm  .98***  1.33**
(.12)  (.62)
wage  1.03***  .65
(.38)  (.47)
R2 .25  .47  .23  .30
#  obs.  39  39  39  39
S.E.R.  .57  .46  .35  .58
aEstimations  use  a  3SLS over the  four  equations  (including  a  price-cost  margin  equation  and
a  labor  equation).  The  table  only reports  results  for the  tariff  and  the  FDI  equation.  Figures  in
parenthesis  are  heteroscedastic-consistent  standard  errors  (White  Robust).  * is for significance  at
the  90% level, ** at  the  95% level and  ***  at  the  99% level.Table 5a
Changes  in Mexico's tariff structure  (log-differences)
1990 vs 1986  1990 vs 1986  1986 to  1990  1986 to  1990
tariff  eq.  (t)  FDI eq.  (s*)  tariff eq.  (t)  FDI  eq.  (s*)
constant  -1.22  -.11**  .04  .01
(.24)  (.06)  (.07)  (.02)
t  -.-  18`  .03
(.08)  (.03)
tt-I  .03**  .04*
(.02)  (.03)
s*  -3.72*  -2.13*
(1.02)  (1.28)
mFDI  0.76  -.66
(.53)  (.98)
nm/yT  .13  -.69
(.52)  (.58)
H  .44**  .07  -.06  .22**
(.22)  (.05)  (.26)  (.09)
k/T  1.  9  7  -2.40**
(.90)  (.36)
A  2.05**  -2.67*
(.85)  (.51)
pcm  (.15)*  -.24
(.02)  (.05)
wage  -.07  -.01
(.08)  (.03)
R2 .27  .17  .27  .02
#  obs.  39  39  156  156
S.E.R.  .37  .10  .40  .09
aEstimations  use a 3SLS  over the four equations  (including  a price-cost  margin equation  and a
labor  equation). The table only reports results  for the tariff  and the FDI equation. The geographic
concentration  index (G) had to be dropped  from the regression  as it is time-invariant.  Figures  in
parenthesis  are heteroscedastic-consistent  standard errors (White Robust). * is for significance  at
the 90%  level,  ** at the 95%  level  and *** at the 99%  level.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2161  Will the Real "Natural Trading  Maurice Schiff  August 1999  M. Kasilag
Partner" Please Stand Up?  39081
WPS2162  Quantifying the  Fiscal Effects  Shantayanan Devarajan  August 1999  H. Sladovich
of Trade Reform  Delfin S. Go  37698
Hong yi Li
WPS2163  Coverage under Old-Age Security  Estelle James  August 1999  M. Leenaerts
Programs and Protection for the  84264
Uninsured - Vhat  Are the Issues?
WPS2164  Challenging El Salvador's Rural  Maureen Lewis  August 1999  M. Lewis,
Health Care Strategy  Gunnar S. Eskeland  39080
Ximena Traa-Valerezo
WPS2165 The Russian City in Transition:  Martha de Melo  August 1999  H. Sladovich
The First Six Years in 10 Volga  Gur Ofer  37698
Capitals
WPS2166  Seeking Votes: The Political  Norbert R. Schady  August 1999  N. Schady
Economy of Expenditures by the  88247
Peruvian  Social Fund (FONCODES),
1991-95
WPS2167  Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital  Deepa Narayan  August 1999  B. Jones
and Poverty  39475
WPS2168  Wage and Productivity Gaps:  Dorte Verner  August 1999  H. Vargas
Evidence from Ghana  37871
WPS2169  Corruption, Public Finances,  Simon Johnson  August 1999  D. Bouvet
and the Unofficial Economy  Daniel Kaufman  35818
Pablo Zoido-Lobat6n
WPS2170  The Distributional Consequences  Ilker Domag  August 1999  A. Carcani
of Monetary Policy: Evidence  30241
From Malaysia
WPS2171  Productivity Growth and Convergence  Will Martin  August 1999  L. Tabada
In Agriculture and Manufacturing  Devashish Mitra  36896
WPS2172  The East Asian Crisis: Investigating  Warwick McKibbin  August 1999  L. Tabada
Causes and Policy Responses  Will Martin  36896
WPS2173  The Intriguing Relation between Adult  Kaushik Basu  August 1999  M. Mason
Minimum  Wage and Child Labor  38811Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paiper
WPS2174 Prospective  Deficits  and  the Asian  Craig  Burnside  September  1999  E. Khi  ie
Currency  Crisis  Martin  Eichenbaum  3-74.  7
Sergio  Rebelo
WPS2175  Sector  Growth  and the Dual  Economy Niels-Hugh  Blunch  September  1999  H. Varcas
Model:  Evidence  from  Cote d'lvoire,  Dorte  Verner  37.871
Ghana.  and  Zimbabwe
WPS21  76 Fiscal  Risks  and the Quality  of  Hana  Polackova  Brixi  September  1999  A. Parton
Fiscal  Adiustment  in Hungary  Anita Papp  85$83
Allen Schick
WPS2177 Fiscal  Adjustment  and Contingent  Hana  Polackova  Brixi  September  1999  A. Partor
Government  Liabiities: Case  Studies  Hafez  Ghanem  85433
Of  the Czech  Republic  and Macedonia  Roumeen  Islam
WPS2178 Nonfarm  Income.  Inequality,  and Land Richard  H. Adams  Jr.  September  1999  M. Coli-ridge-Taylor
In Rural  Egypt  33704
WFS2179 How  Child  Labor  and  Child  Schooling  Ranjan  Ray  September  1999  M. Mason
Interact  with Adult Labor  30809
WPS2180 Regulating  Privatized  Infrastructures Ofelia Betancor  September  1999  G. Chenet-Smith
and Airport  Services  Robert  Rendeiro  36370
WPS21  81  Privatization  and Regulation  of  the  Lourdes  Trujillo  September  1999  G. C.henet-Smith
Seaport Industry  Gustavo  Nombela  36370
WPS2182  The Integration  of  Transition  Constantine  Michalopoulos  September  1999  L. Tabada
Economies  into  the World  Trading  36896
System
WPS21  83 Market  Discipline  and Financial  Asli Demirguq-Kunt  September  1999  K. _abrie
Safety  Net  Design  Harry  Huizinga  31301
WPS2'  84 Financial  Services  and  the World  Aaditya  Mattoo  September  1999  L. Tabada
Trade  Organization:  Liberalization  36996
Commitments  of the Developing
and  Transition  Economies
WPS2185  Financial  Sector Inefficiencies  and  Pierre-Richard  Agenor  September  1999  T. Shie.
Coordination  Failures:  Implications  Joshua  Aizenman  36  :- 7
for Crisis  Management
WPS2186  Contagion,  Bank  Lending  Spreads,  Pierre-Richard  Agenor  September  1999  T  . 5hi
and Output  Fluctuations  Joshua  Aizenman  363-7
Alexander  Hoffmaister